# Best Practices to Prevent Internet Fraud

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#### Start with a laugh...

P.C. Vey, Published by the New Yorker, January 16th, 2006



#### The Art of War – Know Your Enemy

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

- Sun Tzu On the Art of War, about 530 BCE



### Let's Play Tag

- Pros and Cons of Different CDIs
  - Tag (Flash, Cache, Cookie, etc.)
  - Tag-less (HTTP headers, Java script, etc.)
- IP Address is NOT a CDI!!!
  - Much like your clothes are not part of your DNA



## Tag You're Not It

- VMWare
- Disable Cookies
- Uninstall Flash
- Mobile Devices Do Not Support Flash
- Anti-virus and anti-Malware delete tags regularly
- 100% Right or 100% Wrong
- Good for detecting good people
- Not good for detecting the medium to highly sophisticated fraudsters

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Y	ou're NOT It
	A ward



## Fraud Is NOT a Game of Tag

# No problem

# Benefits

- VMWare
- Disable Cookies
- Uninstall Flash
- Anti-Virus and antimalware delete tags regularly
- Mobile devices do not support

- 100% right or 100% wrong – more right than wrong
- Good for detecting good people...AND detecting ALL levels of medium to high sophistication of fraudsters

# Apple Pilot

## Analysis Strategy

- Determine how Device ID can augment current fraud systems
- Analysis to focus on detecting more fraud \$
- 1.Record Device Ids for all fraud orders for first 20 days of pilot
- 2. Match ids against orders in last 10 days
- 3. Measure following metrics
  - Total fraud \$ matched per day
  - Total unblocked \$ matched per day
  - % of total fraud \$ covered
  - Total orders covered per day
  - False positive rate





	PC Print	Cache ID	Cookie ID
% of total fraud covered	19.5%	0.14%	1.7%
% unblocked fraud covered	30.4%	0.0%	0.2%
False positive rate	45.2%	62.5%	40.7%
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### A Customer's View

"From that analysis [of the pilot], my conclusion is that tagging is useful for recognizing good guys, but not for stopping fraud. The good fraudsters defeat the tags. The ones that don't are easily caught through more basic tools (e.g., AVS, CVV2, velocities, etc.)." David Moriarty, Ph.D., Apple, Inc.



## What Others Say About Us?

"A solution that looks beyond HTTP parameters to fingerprint a PC... is now only available from The 41st Parameter.

We recommend this option as the strongest clientless CDI option available on the market today."

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 After The Cookies Crumble: Alternatives for Client Device Identification (17 February 2007)



## The First 40 Parameters

# Is This Fraud?

**Order Information and Web Logs** 

A	В	С	D	E	F
Order ID	D Order Timestamp Billing Email		Billing Zip Code	Browser IP	Browser IP Country
1358955	10/13/11 12:17 AM	vinhnguyen509@hotmail.com	99202-4011	67.185.8.115	United States
1392535	10/13/11 3:52 AM	sandrita_1017@hotmail.com	94559	76.103.150.225	United States
2396715	10/13/11 4:38 AM	yeaokwhatever05@hotmail.com	92703-2632	75.31.69.233	United States
3672519	10/14/11 1:30 PM	timjiles@yahoo.com	53209	76.199.175.61	United States
5921199	10/16/11 4:31 PM	mattaliano_electric@yahoo.com	95037	71.80.231.193	United States
5879575	10/16/11 5:20 PM	bigkidjj@yahoo.com	95355-7891	76.20.120.67	United States
5970599	10/16/11 9:15 PM	lsutton@lynndaleinc.org	30805-3617	69.254.8.233	United States
7297735	10/18/11 3:29 PM	pinder_k05@yahoo.com	94587	75.6.231.37	United States
7410155	10/19/11 12:43 AM	cmwhitson@prodigy.net	21158-4219	71.125.171.155	United States
9729255	10/20/11 7:34 PM	jorgedc006@yahoo.com	94062	69.104.90.240	United States
9753095	10/20/11 9:19 PM	kmlbnz@yahoo.com	33142	76.26.50.51	United States
9774515	10/20/11 11:03 PM	newcenturymedsup@yahoo.com	91205	68.183.218.68	United States



## Still Not Sure?

#### How About Now?

н	I	J	К	L
	Browser Time	Browser		Time Diff (TDL)
Browser Timestamp	Zone	Language	PCPrint	Seconds
10/11/07 5:17 PM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/11/07 8:52 PM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/11/07 9:38 PM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/13/07 6:30 AM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/15/07 9:31 AM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/15/07 10:20 AM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/15/07 2:15 PM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/17/07 8:29 AM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/17/07 5:43 PM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/19/07 12:33 PM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/19/07 2:19 PM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601
10/19/07 4:03 PM	3	ru-ru	7B02A8AC99067CC1168E412B6AA0BF138E76CD84	-3601