

The Twenty-Eighth National HIPAA Summit

John Verdi

March 4, 2019



#### Who is FPF

#### **The Members**

130+

25+

10+

Companies

**Leading Academics** 

Advocates

#### The Mission

Bridging the policymaker-industry-academic gap in privacy policy

Developing privacy protections, ethical norms, and workable business practices

#### The Workstreams


**Connected Cars** Student Data

Internet of Things Health & Genetics


Location & Ad Tech Ethics & De-identification **Smart Cities** 









#### **Surveillance & Law Enforcement**



#### **Online and Cross-Device Tracking**







#### **Smart Home**





Home Assistants...




Appliances...



**Energy Management...** 



#### **Connected Cars**






#### **Social Media**






#### Wearables



## **Use of Public Spaces**





#### **Big Data & Found Data**

Notice
Choice
Data Quality & Integrity
Purpose Specification
Use Limitation
Data Minimization
Security
Accountability






New data sets and corporate research challenge Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPS) and ethical research principles.



#### **Artificial Intelligence**



**Building Public Policy To Address** 

Artificial Intelligence's Impact

By IRVING WLADAWSKY-BERGER

Jan 27, 2017 1:04 pm ET




#### **Algorithmic Learning**



Transparency? Accountability?



#### **Privacy Concerns**





#### One Solution: De-identification

#### A VISUAL GUIDE TO PRACTICAL DATA DE-IDENTIFICATION

What do scientists, regulators and lawyers mean when they talk about de-identification? How does anonymous data differ from pseudonymous or de-identified information? Data identifiability is not binary. Data lies on a spectrum with multiple shades of identifiability.

This is a primer on how to distinguish different categories of data.



**DEGREES OF IDENTIFIABILITY** Information containing direct and indirect identifiers.



**PSEUDONYMOUS DATA** Information from which direct identifiers have been eliminated or transformed, but indirect identifiers remain intact.



**DE-IDENTIFIED DATA** Direct and known indirect identifiers have been removed or manipulated to break the linkage to real world identities.

DE-IDENTIFIED

× ...

ELIMINATED or TRANSFORMED

u



EY

**FUTURE OF PRIVACY** 

**FORUM** 

**ANONYMOUS DATA** Direct and indirect identifiers have been removed or manipulated together with mathematical and technical guarantees to prevent re-identification.



DIRECT IDENTIFIERS Data that identifies a erson without additional information or by linking to information in the public domain (e.g., name, SSN)



INDIRECT IDENTIFIERS Data that identifies an individual indirectly. Helps connect pieces of information until an individual can be singled out (e.g., DOB, gender)



SAFEGUARDS and CONTROLS Technical, organizational and legal controls preventing employees, researchers or other third parties from re-identifying individuals

SELECTED EXAMPLES government-issued ID (e.g., Jane Smith, 123 Main Street, 555-555-555)

1 Unique device ID, license plate, medical record number, cookie, IP address

(e.g., MAC address 68:A8:6D:35:65:03)

Same as Potentially Identifiable except data are also protected by safeguards and controls (e.g., hashed MAC addresses & legal representations) curator retains key (e.g., Jane Smith, diabetes, Hg8 15.1 g/dl = Csrk123)

0

×

0

1

Unique, artificial

pseudonyms replace direct Identifiers (e.g., HIPAA Limited Datasets, John Doe = 5L7T LX619Z)

0

generalized, perturbed, swapped, etc. (e.g., GPA: 3.2 = 3.0-3.5, gender: female = gender: male) protected by safeguards and controls

× ELIMINATED or TRANSFORMED

\*\*\*

0 **CONTROLS IN PLACE** 

For example, noise is calibrated to a data set to hide whether an individual is present or not (differential privacy)

ANONYMOUS

ELIMINATED or TRANSFORMED

ELIMINATED or

data (e.g., statistical data, census data, or population data that 52.6% of Washington, DC residents are women

\*\*\*\*

ELIMINATED or TRANSFORMED


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0

NOT RELEVANT



#### **Re-Identification**



LaTanya Sweeney & Gov.

William Weld

Netflix


AOL Searcher No. 4417749

Paul Ohm's "Database of Ruin"



Demonstrations of re-identification cast doubt on anonymization.





#### **Effects of Expansion**

Technological Development Expanding the Health Data Ecosystem





New Data Sources & Types



Innovative Data Uses




New Stakeholders

Also bringing new privacy questions about the responsible collection, use, and sharing of data and a need for standardized language...

#### **FPF Mobile App Survey**


- Question: Do the most popular health apps on the most used platforms have a linked privacy policy?
- Commissioned by California's Attorney General
- Looked at: 100 Health and Fitness Apps, 91
   Sleep Aid Apps, 41 Fertility-Tracking App
- Outcomes:
  - For Health and Fitness apps, free apps were more likely to have linked privacy policies than paid apps
  - Fertility-Tracking apps had the highest rates of having a linked privacy policy than any other group



\*Apps were not tested for compliance with stated privacy policies\*



#### **App Privacy Still a Challenge**



# You Give Apps Sensitive Personal Information. Then They Tell Facebook.

Wall Street Journal testing reveals how the social-media giant collects a wide range of private data from developers; 'This is a big mess'

**Bloomberg Businessweek** 

■ January 24, 2019, 6:00 AM EST

Period-Tracking Apps Are Monetizing Women's Extremely Personal Data



## Best Practices for Consumer Wearables and Wellness Apps and Devices

- Released August 17, 2016
- Provides a detailed set of guidelines the responsible companies can follow to protect consumer-generated health and wellness data
- Supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

Best Practices for Consumer Wearables & Wellness Apps & Devices

August 17, 2016



The Best Practices for Consumer Wearables & Wellness Apps & Devices was produced with support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.

## Highlights

- Requires opt-in consent for sharing with third parties
- Bans sharing with data brokers, information resellers, and ad networks
- Requires opt-out options for tailored first-party advertisements
- Provides access, correction, and deletion rights
- Supports interoperability with global privacy frameworks and leading app platform standards



## Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing Services

- Released July 31, 2018
- Provides a policy framework for the collection, retention, sharing, and use of genetic data generated by consumer genetic and personal genomic testing companies
- Supported by Ancestry, 23andMe, Helix, MyHeritage, African Ancestry, and Living DNA

Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing Services

July 31, 2018




## Highlights

- Requires detailed transparency about collection, use, sharing, and retention of genetic data
- Provides access and deletion rights
- Requires valid legal process for the disclosure of genetic data to law enforcement and transparency reporting on at least an annual basis
- Restricts marketing based on genetic data
- Requires strong data security protections and privacy by design



#### **Emerging Health Privacy Policy Questions**



Pushing us to re-think how we have traditionally protected the privacy of health information in the United States


Will HIPAA be exempted from, amended by, or repealed by future privacy legislation?




#### **Emerging Challenge: Health Research**

- Uncertainty around the legal basis for processing data for clinical research under the GDPR
- European Data Protection Board (EDPB) issued a Q&A in January clarifying acceptable bases and the interplay between GDPR and the Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR)
- Continuing issue: harmonization across member states





#### **Emerging Challenge: Facial Characterization**



LETTERS | FOCUS

medicine

## Identifying facial phenotypes of genetic disorders using deep learning

Yaron Gurovich \*\*O¹\*, Yair Hanani¹, Omri Bar¹, Guy Nadav¹, Nicole Fleischer¹, Dekel Gelbman¹, Lina Basel-Salmon², Peter M. Krawitz \*\*O⁴\*, Susanne B. Kamphausen⁵, Martin Zenker⁵, Lynne M. Bird⁴, and Karen W. Gripp³

- Facial characterization tools are increasingly able to reveal health information
- When does facial characterization analysis constitute a privacy invasion?
- Accuracy of analysis and the importance of context will need to be addressed



### FPF Infographic on Facial Detection, Characterization, and Recognition Technologies

#### Understanding Facial Detection, Characterization and Recognition Technologies



	DETECTION	CHARACTERIZATION	UNIQUE PERSISTENT IDENTIFIER*	VERIFICATION 1:1	IDENTIFICATION 1:MANY
	Is there a face in this picture?	What assumptions can I make about this face?	What is this person doing, in a limited context, not tied to other PII?	Is this person who they are claiming to be?	Can software determine who this unknown person is?
COMMERCIAL USE CASES	<ul> <li>Camera autofocus</li> <li>Organizing personal on-line albums (landscape v. people)</li> <li>Counting customers (in line, in store, in amusement park, etc.)</li> <li>Virtual eyeglasses</li> <li>Virtual makeup</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>» In-store digital sign serving gender-specific ads (ex. men's clothing to a man)</li> <li>» Non-personalized textual descriptions of photos (ex. man and smiling woman on the beach)</li> <li>» Tracking in-store customer behavior patterns</li> </ul>	» Track customer in-store behavior and shopping patterns	<ul> <li>» Secure facility access</li> <li>» 2d factor ATM verification</li> <li>» 2d factor on-line account login</li> <li>» On-device verification/access</li> <li>» Medicine disbursement</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>» Photo tagging suggestions!</li> <li>» Consumer Loyalty Programs</li> <li>» Targeted Advertising</li> <li>» FR-capable eyewear for the visually impaired</li> </ul>




#### **Emerging Challenge: Genetic Data**

- What does it mean when your personal information implicates the privacy of others?
- De-identification challenges also exist for this sensitive information
- Additional protections (contractual controls, access controls, and security protocols) may need to be employed

The New York Times

#### Most White Americans' DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy Databases



Only two percent of the population needs to have done a DNA test to identify nearly everyone else, researchers found. Leonard Lessin/Science Source

#### **Thank You**

#### John Verdi

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