

## **Session 3.04**

# **Planning for Failure: Developing an Effective Incident Response Plan for HIPAA Compliance**

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# Agenda

- **HIPAA Overview**
  - Protecting Patient Data (PHI)
  - HIPAA Incident Response Requirements
- **State of the Internet**
- **8 Common Mistakes in Incident Response**
- **Object Lessons Straight from the Headlines**
  - Then and now
  - Why health care organizations
- **Investigative Response**
  - Fix, Prosecute, or Notify ??
- **Q&A**

# HIPAA Overview



# HIPAA Overview

- **Affected health care organizations are expected to *protect* Protected Health Information (PHI) from breach or compromise**
- **A key element in protecting PHI will be your organization's plans and procedures for responding to an information security incident**
- **The security standard currently requires that affected organizations have in place**
  - Reporting procedures
  - Response procedures**for dealing with breaches of information security**

# HIPAA Overview

- **§164.308(a)(6)(i) Standard: Security incident procedures.**
  - Implement policies and procedures to address security incidents
- **§164.308(a)(6)(ii) Implementation specification: Response and Reporting (Required).**
  - Identify and respond to suspected or known security incidents; mitigate, to the extent practicable, harmful effects of security incidents that are known to the covered entity; and document security incidents and their outcomes.
- **NOT specifically required by HIPAA**
  - Development and maintenance of an IR plan
    - “Key man” identification
    - Notification and escalation procedures
    - Training of all personnel identified by job function within the plan
    - Routine review and updating of the plan
    - Annual testing of the plan

# HIPAA Overview

- **Health care organizations have to prepare for HIPAA compliance and real world threats**
- **Health care organizations are a target for hackers and thieves because**
  - they process and store PHI
  - they contain attractive corporate assets
- **HIPAA focuses on harm to the patient**
  - Embarrassment
  - Identity Theft
- **Security and Privacy protections overlap**
  - It is often a security breach that leads to a privacy violation

# State of the Global eBusiness Environment



# Defining Events and Incidents

- **Millions of Threats Out There . . .**
  - Events
  - Incidents
- **Defining Events**
  - Typically non-malicious
  - Typically random
    - Global – ISP outages, fiber cuts, power spikes
    - Regional – Earthquake, tornado, flood, etc.
    - Local – Fire, storm damage, pipes burst
  - Typically non-intrusive
  - Typically not intelligence-driven
  - Organizations respond to these events through disaster recovery



# Defining Events and Incidents

- **Defining Incidents**

- Intelligence-driven attacks

- Malicious code – virus, trojan, DoS, etc.
- Hacker

- Typically focused

- Target is identified for whatever reason(s)
- Agenda drives the attack
  - Virus or web defacement for damage
  - Hacking for theft

- Typically malicious

- Always intrusive

- Organizations require incident response procedures

# Examples of Incidents

- Trusted insider copies and removes a large amount of proprietary data from a financial institution
- Unknown entity accesses and removes customer data from a retail industry client, and publishes it
- Administrator observed accessing sensitive government data without specific authorization, however, the individual needs administrative access rights and privileges to those machines
- Financial services provider receives questionable threat from unknown source about proposed hacking activity
- Manufacturer receives credible threat that a known group may try to interrupt a industry-sponsored Internet event

# Slammed on All Sides

Viruses

Employee Error

Rogue Insiders

**Software Bugs**

Corporate Spies

**Script Kiddies**

Web Defacements

**Password Crackers**

Network vulnerabilities

**Denial of Service**

*“SneakerNet”*

War Drivers

**Backdoors**

Worms


**Trojans**

Buffer Overflows

*“Blended Threats”*

# Daily Vulnerability Probes

## Vulnerability Probes per IP address per Day




Source: Statistics provided by ICSA Labs

# Remote Access Trojans Planted Daily


Each leads to perhaps 10-10,000  
compromised PCs

**RATs -- Remote Access Trojans**



Source: Statistics provided by ICSA Labs


# Successful Web Site Attacks:




Source: Statistics provided by ICSA Labs

# Connectivity Scenario Increasingly Complex

The number of interconnections is constantly growing




# Connectivity Scenario





# Increased Connectivity = Increased Risk



**RISK**

Network Size, Services, Connections

# “Get Security”



# How Vulnerable Are You?

**If yours is an average U.S. corporation here's what your network experienced in the last week . . .**

- Every Internet connected devices was "probed" about 14 times per day for known vulnerabilities.
- About a dozen computers somewhere in your organization encountered a computer virus.
- 17 already logged-in desktop computers were inappropriately used by another employee in your company to access information.
- Three people scrounged through desks and drawers looking for someone else's password. One of them succeeded and used it.

Statistics provided by ICSA Labs

# How Vulnerable Are You?

**If yours is an average U.S. corporation here's what your network experienced in the last week . . . .**

- On average six sexually explicit graphics were mailed or shared among some of your users. There is a 50-50 chance that some of these are stored on your network.
- At least one person experimented with a “hacking” tool or technique on the general computers, servers, and databases inside your network in the past month.
- Despite all the press and focus on hacking and viruses, there is a 65% likelihood that the next security breach your staff deals with will come from an insider.

**The odds are good that you will  
experience some sort of breach ....**



.... So what will you do ???



# Incident Response: 8 Common Mistakes

**D'oh!!**



# #8: Failure to Address the Risk

- **Organizations fail to close or shut down attack vector while “fire fighting”**
- **Isolate the attack and halt the spread**
  - Disconnect the system from all network connections
  - Don’t underestimate the scope of the event
  - Unless there is clear and compelling reason to permit a continuation of the breach, stop the attack!





# #7: Failure to Learn from the Past

- **The organization's security training does not include learning from past events, or the maintenance of performance trends**
- **“Those who fail to learn from the past...”**
  - Conduct an “after action”
    - Review the incident
    - Review the response
  - Refine the plan according to the most effective response measures



# #6: Failure to Invoke Escalation Policy

- **Staff fail to notify appropriate personnel and follow IR procedures**
- **It is imperative that the organization develop and implement escalation procedures. Staff should understand when and how to:**
  - Identify an incident
  - Notify IR Coordinator
  - Triage the incident
    - Do no harm
    - Protect life, data, infrastructure, operations
    - Develop and execute a course of action
  - Implement a “need to know” classification
  - Establish “out-of-band” communications channels – PGP, pre-established phone bridge



# #5: Failure to Keep Good Backups

- **When original data is compromised or lost, the organization cannot recover or restore it.**
- **The organization must maintain secure backups and forensically sound media images**
  - Surprisingly, backups are often ignored or forgotten.
  - System compromise is often discovered months after the event; backups should be maintained for several months
  - Creating backups on a regular basis and label media clearly
  - Don't assume that backups are always good; test periodically
  - Periodically verify the correctness and completeness of backups
  - *The best backup scheme in the world is useless if you cannot also do a recover.*



Source: RFC 2196, "Site Security Handbook,"  
September 1997.

# #4: Failure to Document

- **If the organization needs to involve law enforcement to investigate, or chooses to prosecute, complete documentation of the incident is required.**
- **Take Good Notes**
  - Invest the time
    - If it isn't written down, it didn't happen
    - Documentation of incidents is required by HIPAA
  - Use Old Fashioned Pen and Composition Book
    - Harder to alter than electronic files
    - Some jurisdictions view hard copies and paper files as the official records
  - Notes should be Clear, Concise, and to-the-point
    - They may be your only fall-back in court!




# #3: Failure to Protect Potential Evidence

- **During recovery, staff may inadvertently destroy critical evidence, limiting the ability to prosecute**
- **Create and Maintain Secure Copies**
  - Protect it from alteration -- Lock it, document it, limit access to it
  - Make non-invasive copies (bit image)
  - Analysis work from copies of copies - ONLY
  - Protect the “chain-of-custody”
  - Ensure no one touches the system and possible evidence until IRT has gathered and cataloged the evidence.
  - Ensure that no one does the **Wrong Thing**, thinking it is the Right Thing.
    - **Wrong Things** would include
      - Taking a backup, using system backup software
      - Editing the log files for ease of readability or to remove company confidential information



## #2: Failure to Communicate

- **Internal Communications Breakdown**
- It is imperative that staff are trained on Incident Response procedures, and that changes and updates to procedures are communicated on a regular basis. Staff should understand:
  - Defining an “incident”
  - Declaring it an “incident”
  - Invoking the response plan
  - Having common understanding of terms
  - Tracking what has been done and what needs to be done (and documenting it!)



# #1: Failure to Prepare

- **Insufficient, untested, or non-existent IR procedures**
  - No reliable audit trail
  - No accountability
  - Untrusted installation media
  - Untested backup and recovery
  - Disorganized, incomplete, inaccurate, or non-existent logs
  - No physical or electronic access records
  - No working incident response plan
- **Incidents can't be predicted, but preparation is critical**





# Incident Response: Important To-Dos





# Implementing the Basics

- **The organization must maintain a formal Incident Response Policy and clearly documented procedures for dealing with breaches of security.**
- **The policy must include:**
  - Key contacts and contact information;
  - Notification/Escalation;
  - Recovery;
  - Disciplinary Procedures
- **Procedures must be routinely**
  - Reviewed, Updated, and Tested
- **Staff must be**
  - Trained on security and IR
  - Offered refresher information on a regular basis
  - Provided with information on updates to policies and procedures



# A Sound Security Program

## Reviews HR & Management Issues

- Hiring and retention policies for IT/security staff & end-users
- Adequate staffing, authority, responsibility, succession
- “Key Man” and training policies
- Termination

## Performs electronic testing

- Firewall(s) & Routers
- Devices visible to the Internet
- Network segmentation
- Active/Inactive modems
- OS levels & patches
- Anti-virus software

## Reviews Network Architecture

- Segmentation
- Critical Devices
- User rights and permission

## A Sound Security Program

## Inspects Physical Security

- Door locks and alarms
- Security cameras and monitoring
- Visitor access logs
- HVAC, fire suppression, etc.
- Racks and cabling

## Reviews Business Policies & Procedures

- Backup and failover contingency
- Redundancy, disaster recovery, and business continuity planning
- Current equipment inventory
- Third-party provider SLAs & liability
- User rights and permissions
- End-user computing policies

# Issues to Consider

- Extend IR Plan across the enterprise
- Just like the organization's security program, the IR Plan must become part of the corporate culture
- Incident Response Plan must be supported in-house
- Include HR, PR, Legal, Administration, and Senior Management



# Learn from the Common Mistakes

- **Incidents can't be predicted; preparation is critical**
  - Implement and maintain a reliable audit trail for accountability
  - Maintain baseline systems with known Hash values
  - Maintain trusted installation media
  - Securely maintain validated backup and recovery
  - Maintain logs – where, what, how old, and review
  - Generate reports – log reports may qualify as “business records” – admissible as evidence
  - Maintain physical and electronic access records

# Lessons Learned

## A Look at the Headlines . . . .



# Are You a Target ??

- Health care organizations
  - not typically viewed as hacking targets
  - Not as obvious as banks, e-retailers, etc.
- But
  - Process and store huge amounts non-public personal consumer information
    - SSN, insurance information, payment information, etc.
  - Payment and insurance information is a target for fraud
  - SSN is the key to identity theft

# Case A

## Hacker Accesses Patient Records

*By Robert O'Harrow Jr.*

Washington Post Staff Writer

Saturday, December 9, 2000; Page E01

**“A hacker gained access to confidential medical information at the University of [ABC] Medical Center, using the Internet to download thousands of files containing patient names, conditions, home addresses and Social Security numbers, hospital officials said yesterday. “**

# The Highlights

- In this case, a hacker specifically targeted the hospital
  - Because of the PHI
  - Because of the perceived security weakness
  - Executed a relatively simple exploit
  - “To make a point”
- Hacker had unrestricted access for over six months
- Hospital KNEW there was an intruder in the network, didn't realize that data was compromised
- Patients PHI publicly disclosed



# Then and Now

- **Incident occurred in December 2000**
  - Health care industry viewed it as an object lesson
  - Pointed to security and privacy issues
  - “No harm done”
- **A similar incident in 2003??**
  - Plaintiffs attorneys are circling.....
  - Consumer privacy advocacy
  - Identity theft awareness
  - There is going to be a push to establish case law/ precedent
  - “Good Faith Effort”, following well documented procedures, and other “proactive measures” will be an organization’s best defense in court

# Case B

## Tiny Nevada hospital attacked by Russian hacker

USA Today Online

April 7, 2003

**RENO (AP) — A hacker who invaded the computer system at [Case C]Hospital in Ely has been traced to the former Soviet Union, authorities said.**

# The Highlights

- **Hacker**

- Did not specifically target the hospital
- Used the Al-Jazeera website as an attack conduit
- Did not access PHI
- Did access employee SSN and payment records

- **Hospital response**

"It was just after 6 a.m. and I saw an active connection from outside, on a path through the emergency room to the payroll computer, but I knew no one was in the payroll office." He ran to the affected computer and pulled the plug.

- Informed FBI – performed forensics
- Took immediate corrective action – Revised end-user policies


# Case in Point

- **There's no telling what will attract some hackers . . .**
  - **“Capture the flag”** – greater glory and personal bests (traditional and almost old-fashioned)
  - **“altruistic”** – making statements and proving points (Deceptive Duo, S4t4n1c\_S0uls, and The Bugz)
  - **“scorched earth” attackers** – setting off logic bombs and self-replicating worms simply to destroy as much data as possible
  - **Thieves** – credit card fraud, insurance fraud, ID theft (fun and profit)

# And don't forget . . .

- **The disgruntled employee !!!**
- **Recent Novell research indicates [Case C]**
  - More than half the UK workforce\* would be prepared to seek revenge on former employers by exploiting continued access to corporate systems if they were unhappy at losing their job
  - 55% would continue to use their company laptop if it were not taken back; 58% would continue use of company mobile phones.
  - 6% said that they would delete important files
  - 4% would let a virus loose in the corporate email system
  - 67% would be prepared to steal sensitive information that would help in their next job
  - 38% said that they would steal company leads

# Fix, Prosecute or Notify??



# When to Notify ??

- **Now required in California**
  - **CA SB 1386**
    - Affects organizations that do business in, have customers in, or have employees in California
    - Must provide appropriate notification to said individuals if systems are compromised and personal data is exposed
  - **The organization must contact the individual**
    - In writing or through email
    - Publicly, if private conduit fails
  - **The organization must inform the individual that their personal information was or may have been compromised**

# When to Notify ??

- **Exceptions**

- Does not apply to organizations that do not store personal customer information or personal employee information on computers
- If the data was encrypted in storage at the time of the breach

- **National legislation proposed**

- Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) proposed similar legislation in the Senate
- Will California courts establish privacy case law?



# Investigative Response

- **One step beyond incident response**
  - **There is no requirement under the HIPAA Security Standard to investigate or prosecute**
  - **Not a decision that the organization can reasonably make during an incident**
  - **Create a decision tree**
    - Establish parameters – when to fix, if and when to investigate
    - Fixing and investigating can sometimes be mutually exclusive
    - Organization needs to understand the impact of investigation and prosecution
    - Incorporate these decisions and procedures into the Incident Response Plan

# When to Fix ??

- **Resolution of incidents is at the discretion of the organization**
  - **Typically, fixing is associated with simple mistakes**
    - Blunders
    - Misuse of privilege
    - Well-intentioned employees
  - **Administrative matters**
    - No evidence of criminal intent
    - No harm done
    - May involve disciplinary measures for the employee
    - Formal documentation of the incident is sufficient

# When to Prosecute ??

- **Also at the discretion of the organization**
  - **Typically associated with more complex attacks**
    - Malicious intent
  - **Civil or criminal activity**
    - PHI or corporate data clearly accessed, stolen, altered
    - Intellectual property accessed, stolen, or altered
    - Damage to systems, services, devices, or data
    - Evidence of an external intruder
  - **In cases of a PHI breach or privacy violation, furtherance of the organization's good faith effort**
    - Hard to prove negligence

# Brace for Impact

- **In either case, the organization must be prepared**
  - **Freeze systems as long as it takes to establish the forensic trail**
    - Isolate affected systems
    - Invoke business continuity plan to maintain operations
  - **Submit to the authorities**
    - Local law enforcement search
    - Federal law enforcement search and seizure of equipment and data
    - Provide resources for the duration of the investigation
  - **Prosecution takes time and resources**

# Summing up . . . .

- **Plan for failure** –
  - **Develop policies and procedures** – for responding to security incidents across the organization, and include all appropriate personnel
  - **Maintain the plan** – keep it current and test it annually
  - **Learn from the common mistakes** – yours and others
  - **Think outside of HIPAA** – there are resources in your organization outside of PHI that may be targeted
  - **When possible, spend in parallel** – if HIPAA controls make sense for other areas of the organization, take the opportunity to implement
  - **Make decisions now** – not during an actual emergency

# Q & A



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