


Toward a high performing health system Accountable Care: Past, Present and Future

Elliott Fisher, MD, MPH

Director, The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice John E. Wennberg Distinguished Professor, Geisel School of Medicine

Origins: variations in spending across regions and academic centers






Spending and resource use chronically ill, last 6 months of life	NYU Langone Medical Center		Mayo Clinic (St. Mary's Hospital)	
	2001-05	2014	2001-05	2014
Total Medicare spending	\$57,716		\$28,763	
Hospital days	31.2		12.0	
Physician visits	76.9		23.9	

How can the best medical care in the world cost twice as much as the best Medical care in the world?

Uwe Reinhardt

Origins: variations in spending across regions and academic centers






Spending and resource use chronically ill, last 6 months of life	NYU Langone Medical Center		Mayo Clinic (St. Mary's Hospital)	
	2001-05	2014	2001-05	2014
Total Medicare spending	\$57,716	\$71,706	\$28,763	\$39,505
Hospital days	31.2	15.6	12.0	9.8
Physician visits	76.9	47.8	23.9	20.9

How can the best medical care in the world cost twice as much as the best Medical care in the world?

Uwe Reinhardt

Origins: no evidence of benefit from greater use of discretionary care



- (1) Ann Intern Med: 2003; 138: 273-298
- (2) Health Affairs web exclusives, October 7, 2004
- (3) Health Affairs, web exclusives, Nov 16, 2005
- (4) Health Affairs web exclusives, Feb 7, 2006
- (5) Ann Intern Med: 2006; 144: 641-649

Original theory – how might we improve health system performance?

Problems needing attention

Rising costs; overuse of supply-sensitive care

Quality uneven

Patient care fragmented and poorly coordinated

Original theory:

Organizations accountable for defined population (all patients; all their needs)

Focus on total cost of care: create incentives to reduce capacity and overuse

Provider leadership – central role for physicians

Collaborative model: across continuum of care; with payers as partners

Meaningful measures of quality, rewards for improvement

Flexibility: but with goal of fully integrated care and single business model

Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward In Medicare

Real savings to the Medicare program could occur within five years with only modest changes in providers' spending behavior.

by Elliott S. Fisher, Mark B. McClellan, John Bertko, Steven M. Lieberman, Julie J. Lee, Julie L. Lewis, and Jonathan S. Skinner

What is the current evidence

ACO growth continues

ACO contracts increasing – public and private payers; Penetration varies across US

Impact on costs

Overall savings small, highly variable

Some have achieved year on year savings; others nothing

AQC shows increasing savings over time.

Impact on quality

Technical quality improving substantially across almost all ACOs Patients report better overall quality and access to care

Interesting findings

Spillover effects for Medicare beneficiaries cared for by commercial ACOs **Focus important:** Savings greatest among high-cost, high risk populations **Discretionary care?** ACOs are reducing (a) hospitalizations, (b) ER utilization; (c) low value care

How should we interpret the evidence?

Surprises:

Degree of behavior change observed is substantial, given weak incentives Reduction in low value care contrasts with "blunt" instrument of cost-sharing Spillover effects point to changes in both clinical and system behaviors

Perhaps there is something about ACOs & health professional leadership?

New payment models enable physicians to do the right thing

Physician judgment is essential to good decision-making at point of care

Few decisions are black or white; most are in "gray areas"

Organizational support is essential for redesign of care

Care-transitions programs

Integration of behavioral and medical services

Partnerships with other organizations

Challenges

Prices remain a problem – for privately insured patients

Consolidation continues, perhaps accelerated by ACOs And – there is <u>remarkable</u> variation in prices across US

	Private Spending		Medicare Spending	
High Private, High Medicare	Actual	Rank	Actual	Rank
Manhattan, NY	\$4,152	272	\$13,576	304
Napa, CA	\$5,516	306	\$10,117	233
High Private, Cheap Medicare				
La Crosse, WI	\$4,272	285	\$6,844	1
Rochester, MN	\$4,564	296	\$7,433	14
Cheap Private, High Medicare				
San Bernadino, CA	\$2,543	6	\$11,189	276
Tacoma Park, MD	\$2,966	40	\$10,130	235
Cheap Private, Cheap Medicare				
Dubuque, IA	\$2,573	9	\$7,243	5
Rochester, NY	\$2,196	3	\$7,285	8

Challenges

Prices remain a problem – for privately insured patients

Consolidation continues, perhaps accelerated by ACOs And – there is <u>remarkable</u> variation in prices across US

Most patients remain in the dark

Few are aware that they are in an ACO ACOs struggling with approaches to "patient engagement"

Technical challenges are substantial

Benchmarks; timing of transition to risk; how much risk; Regulatory relief, malpractice reform; Implementation and alignment of MACRA reforms: MIPS, definitions of APMs Relationship of episodes and bundles to ACOs

"Social" challenges

What to do about weak incentives

Complexity of changes -- distraction

Persistent schisms: primary care vs specialists; hospitals vs physicians

How might we strengthen incentives?

Be clear about where we are going – and align programs toward that goal

Continue transition toward two-sided payment models and capitation

Next-Gen model

MSSP Track 3

APMs under MACRA

Accelerate public and private payer alignment

Having all-payer model may be more important than two sided risk Not getting a reward can be framed as a loss

Align episode-based payment with total cost of care accountability

Episodes helpful: engage specialists and hospitals in managing to a budget


Challenge: they don't solve the volume problem

Solution: end-game must have episodes managed within total-cost of care

incentive


How might we strengthen incentives?

Think about all elements driving costs – and address each one



The challenges we faced 10 years ago remain:

Health care continues to crowd out important social spending



It is possible to do better

Some systems are making substantial progress

Optimus: Reducing costs each year for past 4, with shared savings

Tucson: year over year reductions; finally receiving shared savings bonus

Why is it working?


Data: on quality and cost of care – and how to improve both

Physicians: want to provide great care to their patients

Threat? Distraction




Jim Barr



Pal Evans

It may be working – in some places



Redesigning care can give our patients back their lives

