Improving Emergency Management Standards Where to go from here?

Robert A. Wise, M.D. VP – Division of Standards & Survey Methods The Joint Commission

Overview

- New Standards for 2008 and 2009
- Review of debriefing of recent disasters
- What are next challenges?



A Brief History of Emergency Management Standards

Pre-2001 Standards

- Legacy Standards
- Disaster Based (before "all hazard")
- Emphasis on response phase
- Minimal community planning
- 2001 Standards
 - Heavily influenced by DoD and VA
 - Growing international/domestic threats
 - HVA,
 - All Hazards,
 - 4 phases,
 - Community coordination,
 - hospital leadership



2008 Standards Developed after reviewing 5 years of disasters

Debriefed Multiple Hospitals & Communities: Sample of Debriefings

- First Tropical Storm Allison June/2001
- 9/11 September 2001
- Power Outage Summer 2003
- San Diego Wild Fires Summer 2003
- Hurricane Isabel Fall 2003
- SARS (Asia/Toronto) Spring 2003
- Multiple hurricanes in Gulf and Florida- 2004-05
- Katrina/Rita 2005



6 Critical Parameters Became structure of 2008 standards

Communications

With staff; suppliers; EOC

Supplies

Unclear inventory, lack of reliable supplier

Security

- Protection of assets (drugs, fuel, vaccine);
- Ability to maintain operations

Staff

Housing; pay; family; mental health; safety; leadership

Utilities

Fuel; electricity; water (potable and others); sewage - others (ventilation, medical gases)

Clinical Activity

- Vulnerable populations, changing patient needs; ongoing assessment;
- (altered standards of care)



2008 Standards Overview

- Planning to Manage Consequences (EC.4.11)
- Emergency Operation Plan (EC.4.12)
- Critical Parameters
 - Communications (EC.4.13)
 - Supplies (EC.4.14)
 - Security (EC.4.15)
 - Staff (EC.4.16)
 - Utilities (EC.EC.4.17)
 - Clinical Activity (EC.4.18)
- Exercises & CQI (EC.4.20)



Expanded and New Requirements

Highlight in RED postponed from 1/08 to 1/09

In that dialog with field, suggests the state of preparedness of the country

EC.4.11 Managing Consequences of Emergencies

- Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA)
 - Broad review of threats
 - In sync with community
 - Prioritize events
- Communicates to community, needs & vulnerabilities
 - Recognizes unresponsive communities remain
- For each event in HVA, define
 - Mitigation activities
 - Preparedness activities
 - Response strategies
 - Recovery strategies



EC.4.11 Managing Consequences of Emergencies

- **EP#9** <u>Document inventory</u> of onsite assets & resources; to include
 - PPE
 - Staffing
 - Water, fuel
 - Medical, surgical, pharmaceuticals
- **EP#10** -Methods for monitoring quantities of assets and resources during emergency
- Scope, objectives, performance of emergency management planning is annually evaluated



EC.4.12 Develop Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)

- Develop & maintain Emergency Operations Plan
- Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)
 - Establishes ICS consistent with community's
 - Identifies staff reporting relationships
 - EP#6 The Plan identifies capacity and establishes response efforts in <u>6 critical areas</u> when organization cannot be supported by community for at least 96 hours
 - Evacuation is an acceptable strategy but reallocation preferred
 - Identifies alternative sites for care



Striving for more....

Normal - Generator Fuel

Conserve resources – shut down floors, cancel elective surgeries

Normal – Clinical Supplies

Curtail services – curtail services, discharge patients

Normal – Water (Sanitary)

Conserve resources – save water (sponge baths, waste disposal).

0 hrs

24 hrs

48 hrs

EC.4.13 – Emergency Communications

- Internal planning with staff, external authorities, patients and families
- Communicating with suppliers and services during emergency



EC.4.14 – Managing resources and assets

- Potential sharing of resources and assets with HCOs outside of community
- Transporting patients with supplies and staff to alternative care site



EC.4.15 Managing safety/security

Identifies role of community security and coordination with agencies



EC.4.16 – Defines & manages staff roles

- Roles and responsibilities are defined for all critical areas
- Training for roles
- Communication to physicians and other licensed independent physicians and to whom they report



EC.4.17 Managing utilities

Identifies alternative means of providing fuel for building operations or essential transport



EC.4.18 Managing services

- Clinical services of vulnerable population served by organization
- Mental health services of patients
- Mortuary services
- Documenting and tracking patient clinical information



EC.4.20 EOP: Scope of Exercises

EP#3 - One exercise is escalated to evaluate performance when community cannot support the organization



EC.4.20 EOP: Scope of Exercises

- **EP#11-13** 6 critical functions monitored
- Exercises are critiqued
- Completed exercises are critiqued through multi-disciplinary process
- EOP modified in response to critiques
- Improvements to EOP are evaluated during next exercise
- Strengths/weaknesses are communicated to responsible multidisciplinary team



And the disasters continue...

Disasters Debriefed Since 2005

- Southern California wild fires 2007
- Hurricane Gustav 8/2008
- ► Hurricane Ike 9/2008



What is Important? Preserving Community's Medical Care

- Maintain medically frail in community
- Preserve hospital beds for seriously ill

The Threat to Medical Care

-Decrease <u>supply</u> of hospital alternatives -Increase <u>demand</u> for hospital beds

- Long Term Care (only segment with expected resiliency)
- Home Care closed
- Dialysis Center closed (no generators)
- Threat of loss of Ventilators/Oxygen
- Physician Offices closed
- Outpatient Pharmacy closed
- Discharged patients (wouldn't leave)



Debriefing of 2nd Assault

- San Diego
 - Wild fires 2003
 - Wild fires 2007
- New Orleans
 - Hurricane Katrina & Rita 2005
 - Hurricane Gustav 2008
- Houston
 - Tropical Storm Allison 2001
 - Hurricane Rita 2005
 - Hurricane Ike 2008



Focus of Second Debriefings

- Most important improvements
- Resilience of other healthcare providers
- Able to protect surge capacity
- Improve decision to evacuate or shelter in place
- Handling of 6 critical parameters
- Communication with:
 - **Staff**
 - Citizens
 - **MCO**
 - **Community**



Some Highlights from Debriefings

- San Diego Hospital Association
- Houston Hospital
- New Orleans Charity/University reps



Coordination of Emergency Planning

- San Diego County level
- Texas Regional level
- New Orleans- cooperation of public hospitals



Communication Systems

- Reverse 911 landline
- AlertSanDiego registration of cell phones
- 211 where to seek services; could register
- Emergency Alert System (EAS) ongoing communication to population – when to return home
- RSAN Roam Secure Alert Network- 2008 purchase
- WebEOC hospitals
- Local media
- New Orleans minimal new city sponsored communication to citizens

Staff, Families, and Pets

- San Diego & Houston
 - Able to handle pets off-site and even horses (San Diego)
 - Houston- needed food, water, leash, and crate
 - Set up help for children and elderly of staff but needed to bring own supplies
- New Orleans Public hospital
 - No pets or support of family
 - Given time to make other arrangements



Security

- Not an issue in any cities though New Orleans public hospital security now equipped & trained with assault-style rifles
- Houston hired extra security implemented armbands for family – dedicated security for childcare (since Allison)



Evacuation

- Not needed in Houston
 - Increase expectation that LTC can "shelter in place"
- San Diego did successfully evacuate 3 hospitals and many LTC facilities
- New Orleans no evacuation

Special Needs

- Walgreens and CVS brought in pharmacy trucks and access to national network
- Community told to bring pill bottles
- Much more attention paid to oxygen who needed it, where it was needed; rationing was required
- ✓ Dialysis remains a national problem patients refused transporting to distant site



What Determined Best Results?

- Second disaster similar to first (wild fire/hurricane)
- Systematic improvement driven by after-action
- Improvement with community-wide communication
 - Reverse 911, 211, WebEoc
- Improved coordination of multiple facilities
 - Government-based better than system inside of system
- Hospitals are integral part of community planning

Conclusion

Debriefings and Org discussions

- Significant improvement possible in 3 years (same disaster)
- Community-based communication better and important
- Need to harden multiple parts of delivery system
 - Long Term Care
 - Access to pharmacy
 - Increase use of shelter for special needs
- Community planning is preferred over aggregation of hospitals
- Inadequate experience:
 - With less warning of disaster e.g. terrorist attacks
 - When evacuation not possible (quadrant 4) e.g.. Pandemic
- Unknown results of disasters with
 - No warning e.g. terrorist attacks
 - Evacuation not possible e.g., pandemic

Questions?

Rwise@jointcommission.org