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
Background

- The 2009 national N1H1 outbreak provided a chance to explore variation in PH response
- The role of accreditation of particular interest – promote standardization, interoperability, quality
- Two vehicles for study: PERRCs and PBRNs

Objectives


- Describe the nature and timing of the public health response to H1N1 outbreak in NC (and KY, MA, WA)
- Test for differences in local response between accredited and non-accredited health agencies
- Identify factors that facilitated and inhibited H1N1 response activities
- Use findings to create After Action Reports (AARs) and identify improvement areas for public health agencies

PERRCs and PBRNs in December 2009



- 1st PBRN cohort (n=5)
- 2nd PBRN cohort (n=7)
- PERRCs (n=10)

Accreditation in North Carolina



SOURCE: http://nciph.sph.unc.edu/accred/about_nclhda/progress.htm

Study Design & Methods

- Case-control study of 9 communities selected to contrast accreditation status
- Structured interviews capture key elements of the nature & timing of investigation & response
- Factor analysis used to group survey items into domains and construct composite measures of *scope* and *timing*
- Multivariate models used to test for differences by accreditation status, controlling for domain and community fixed effects

Analytic strategy

- Problem: small # communities, large # measures
- Desire to summarize patterns across measures, but also maximize power to detect differences across communities
- Bayesian Hierarchical Latent Variable Model – use variability across measures & communities

Logit (t_{qi}) = f (a_0 - intercept/baseline rate


$a_q\theta_i$ - association between q and latent quality in comm.

a_jD_j - association between q and type of activity

a_A - association between q and accreditation status

s_q - random error)

Study Communities



Survey Items

NUMBER OF ITEMS


| DOMAIN | SCOPE: was activity performed? | TIMING: Days since outbreak* |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Planning | 45 | -- |
| Communication | 105 | 14 |
| Incident command | 9 | 4 |
| Investigation | 21 | 6 |
| Response and mitigation | 27 | 13 |
| Total | 207 | 37 |

***Outbreak onset defined as 15April2009**


Example Survey Items

| <u>Item</u> | <u>Pct/Mean</u> |
|--|--------------------|
| Planning: local plan is in place for enforcing isolation and quarantine orders | 89% scope |
| Communication: physician guidelines were disseminated about acquisition of supplies | 44% scope |
| Incident command: local EOC was activated | 43% scope |
| Investigation: days to initiation of hospital case-finding activities | 16.5 timing |
| Response: health alert network notification | 33% scope |
| Mitigation: contact notification initiated | 67% scope |


Scope and Timing of H1N1 Response Activities: Composites from All 9 Communities



Scope and Timing of H1N1 Response Activities: by Agency Accreditation Status




Multivariate-adjusted Scope of H1N1 Activities



Controlling for domain-level heterogeneity and community-level heterogeneity

Multivariate-adjusted Timing of H1N1 Activities



Controlling for domain-level heterogeneity and community-level heterogeneity

Conclusions and implications

- Wide variation in the scope and timing of local public health responses to H1N1
- Accredited agencies implemented a broader scope of responses
- Accredited agencies implemented IC and investigation activities more rapidly
- Accreditation may confer and/or detect enhanced capacity for H1N1 response



What's next

- Qualitative analyses to understand mechanisms behind the differences
- Multi-state analyses across NC, KY, MA, QA
- Larger-scale data collection in 2010 – statewide in NC and propensity-matched comparison group



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