# POPULATION BASED PAYMENT® A "Buy Right Strategy"

# IHA Conference March 23-25, 2011 San Francisco, CA



## **Current Physician Compensation Models**

There are many mechanisms for paying physicians; some are good and some are bad. The three worst are fee-for service, capitation, and salary.

James Robinson, Milbank Quarterly. 2001



### **Adam Smith's Sound Market Theory**

The most powerful device for productivity improvement ever invented by mankind is Adam Smith's sound market. Even the Soviets know that Karl was wrong and Adam was right. Competition in sound markets is the most powerful device ever invented to make producers serve consumer interests. The present *unsound* health care market stringently rewards providers for costraising behavior, independent of health results. *However, if you change the way you buy – start buying right – then providers will be compelled to perform well*.

Walter McClure, Chairman, Center for Policy Studies. October 20, 1990



### **Compensation Arrangements Under Consideration – 2011**

- Capitation
- Fee for Service

Robinson's - "Three worst."

- Salary
- Case Rates with and without guarantees
- Bundled Payments
- P4P
- Risk
- Shared Savings
- Medical Homes
- ACO's with and without risk







### **Accountable Care Organizations\***

- Identify hospitals as the "natural organization" within which to improve care
- Local health delivery systems are the driver for change
- Advocate the value of shared physician accountability
- Establish spending benchmarks for ACOs
- Performance measures are established to promote accountability
- Shared savings bonuses are distributed only if an ACO's performance is below its benchmark















## **Population Based Payment**<sub>®</sub>

A framework and process for compensating health care practitioners for providing an agreed upon set of services for a specified population of covered beneficiaries for a specific period of time.



# It is Not -

# CAPITATION

**RISK** 





# • A PHYSICIAN CENTRIC SHARED SAVINGS MODEL



# Why the Time is Right for Population Based Payment®

### Market Forces

- Section 3022 of ACA Shared Savings Model
- Movement to Accountable Care Organizations
- American Recovery and Reinvestment Bill –HITECH ACT
- Clear FTC Advisory Opinions TriState Health Partners April 23, 2009
- Current Compensation Models are being challenged
- The Process Steps are logical
  - Traditional Financial Modeling Principles can be used
  - Framework supports principles of Evidenced Based Medicine and Clinical Protocols



### POPULATION BASED PAYMENT® PROGRAM FEATURES

• Enables payors and providers to:

- Continue to submit claims and receive payment using standard industry billing and reimbursement arrangements

- Use providers' claim history to establish financial benchmarks
- Mutually benefit from improvements in medical claim expense



### POPULATION BASED PAYMENT® PROGRAM FEATURES Continued

- Utilize HEDIS and other population based metrics to monitor and improve outcomes
- Incentivize high cost providers to participate
- Move unorganized providers into FTC compliant clinically integrated joint ventures
- Benefit from the use of available HiTech Act funding for EHR adoption efforts



## **Characteristics of Population Based Payment® Arrangements:**

- Clinically integrated provider panels
- Historical medical claim cost experience is actuarially determined
- Clinical guidelines are in place
- Performance targets are established for :
  - Quality/Outcomes
  - Efficiency
- Established mechanisms are in place for routine and ad hoc reporting



## INCENTIVE MODEL COMPARISON


		INCENTIVE MODEL TYPES			
	INCENTIVE MODEL FEATURES	POPULATION BASED PAYMENT	ACO	GLOBAL PAYMENT	
1	No change in claim submission process	•	θ	ο	
2	Physician centric	•	0	θ	
3	Hospital or health system centric	ο	•	θ	
4	Historical PMPM is used to document cost trends and establish financial benchmarks	•	0	ο	
5	HEDIS and other 3rd party measures are used to establish, monitor and reward outcomes	•	•	•	
6	Providers are rewarded via a gain-share arrangement (50/50) after reaching cost benchmarks	•	٠	ο	
7	High cost providers are incentivized to join clinically integrated provider panels	•	0	ο	
8	Supports all lines of business and all product types	•	θ	θ	
9	Counties with at least 10,000 covered lives	•	•	θ	



Poor - O



## **Population Based Payment**




### **Historical Claim Cost and Target PMPM:**

Premium	
Member Cost	
Total Members	

\$291.28 \$236.62 10,656





Strategy • Contracting • Network Management

These 3 hospitals share common primary and secondary service areas

#### Abington Memorial Hospita

•DRG 195 - \$6,916 •DRG 293 - \$7,307 •G 310 - \$5,510 •DR •92 - \$5,077 •DRG 47 \$14,007

#### **Doylestown Hospital**

- DRG 195 \$6,312
- DRG 293 \$6,568
- DRG 310 \$4,478
- DRG 392 \$6,312
- DRG 470 \$12,973


#### **Grand View Hospital**

•DRG 195 - \$6,667 •DRG 293 - \$6,267 •DRG 310 - \$4,858 •DRG 392 - \$4,664 •DRG 470 - \$12,699

DRG - 195 Simple pneumonia DRG - 293 Heart failure DRG - 310 Cardiac arrhythmia DRG - 392 Esophagitis DRG - 470 Major joint replacement



## **Facility Cost Comparisons**



Source – American Hospital Directory Based on Medicare IPPS claim data (2009)



### Savings Opportunity Facility Spend Generic Drug Dispensing Rate

Hosp				RX Spend	
Spend = 31%		Reduction	Annualized	@\$0.75 PMPM	
of Tot Spend	PMPM	11.0%	100% of move	per/1% Change	75%
2011	\$91	\$10	\$1,199,693	1%	\$90,000
2011	\$98	\$11	\$1,289,676	2%	\$180,000
2013	\$105	\$12	\$1,386,411	3%	\$270,000
2014	\$113	\$12	\$1,490,347	4%	\$360,000
2015	\$121	\$13	\$1,602,141	5%	\$450,000
2016	\$130	\$14	\$1,722,323	6%	\$540,000
2017	\$140	\$15	\$1,851,466	7%	\$630,000
				8%	\$720,000
				9%	\$810,000
				10%	\$900,000





Delivering Quality, Convenience and Value in prescription fulfillment at the point-of-care.

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QuiqMeds improves prescription compliance and patients love the convenience! As Many as


20% of Prescriptions Never Get Filled 33% of Refills Never Leave the Pharmacy Replay

#### QUALITY, CONVENIENCE and VALUE

The QuiqMeds system increases the quality of care and enhances the trusted relationship between the physician and patient by providing patients with the most often prescribed medications at the time of their office visit.

The practice of prescribing and fulfilling prescriptions by physicians in their offices is supported by numerous national organizations including the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Federal Trade Commission, which claims that it "increases service and price competition among practitioners and between practitioners and pharmacists, to The QuiqMedsïč½ System On the leading edge of inoffice pharmaceutical fulfillment, QuiqMeds offers an easy to use, intuitive delivery system to physicians and office staff. User friendly software, accessible through

any local computer, is linked directly to the QuiqMeds Inventory Control Cabinet (ICC) which contains up to 700 units of controlled-access inventory. Using a computer touch screen, the doctors order prescription medications, which will be delivered by the office staff at check out. Patients pay for and receive their medication along with the appropriate consumer drug information. This is a one step financial transaction. This savings realized by eliminating layers of administrations is passed on to the physician and the patient. Learn More.



QuiqMeds Demo Video



The QuiqMeds System is intuitive, easy to use and benefits the physician and the patient.ii.1½ Click here for a brief demo.



### **Population Based Payment® - Financial Model**

Practice	PMPM	Members	<b>Monthly Cost</b>	Distribution				
Practice 1	\$203.66	2,801	\$570,460	\$39,766				
Practice 2	\$224.61	3,695	\$829,919	\$52,458				
Practice 3	<b>\$261.54</b>	679	\$177,585	\$9,639				
Practice 4	\$291.92	1,146	\$252,024	\$16,269				
Practice 5	\$429.38	617	\$264,924	<b>\$8,759</b>				
Practice 6	\$255.31	558	\$142,461	\$7,921				
Practice 7	\$244.85	1,160	\$284,025	\$16,468				
Total	\$236.62	10,656	\$2,521,401	\$151,284				
Target Savings of \$5.92 *(10,656*12) = \$757,002								

Provider Gain-share after first 2.5% = 50/50 1% reduction = \$2.37\*.5 = \$1.18 \*(10,656\*12) = \$151,284



# What the skeptics say!

- What is the value of the model after initial savings are achieved?
- Providers have to assume some risk in order for the model to work. PBP is an upside only model.
- Why would a plan support efforts to foster provider collaboration; namely, giving up market leverage?



## Value of the Model after Year 1

	PMPM		Annualized		Annualized		Annualized		Annualized		Annualized
	TREND	PMPM @	Savings/MM		Savings/MM		Savings/MM		Savings/MM		Savings/MM
YEAR	107.5%	105.0%	120000	104.0%	120000	103.0%	120000	102.0%	120000	101.0%	120000
2008	\$236.00										
2009	\$253.70	\$247.80	\$708,000	\$245.44							
2010	\$272.73	\$266.39	\$761,400	\$263.85							
2011	\$293.18	\$286.37	\$817,620	\$283.64	\$1,144,896	\$280.91	\$1,472,172	\$278.18	\$1,799,448	\$275.46	\$2,126,724
2012	\$315.17	\$307.84	\$879,720	\$304.91	\$1,231,536	\$301.98	\$1,583,352	\$299.04	\$1,935,168		
2013	\$338.81	\$330.93	\$945,780	\$327.78	\$1,323,984	\$324.63	\$1,702,188	\$321.47	\$2,080,392		
2014	\$364.21	\$355.75	\$1,015,140	\$352.36	\$1,421,712	\$348.97	\$1,828,284	\$345.59	\$2,234,856		
2015	\$391.53	\$382.42	\$1,093,140	\$378.78	\$1,530,192	\$375.14	\$1,967,244	\$371.49	\$2,404,296		
2016	\$420.90	\$411.11	\$1,175,220	\$407.19	\$1,645,056	\$403.28	\$2,114,892	\$399.36	\$2,584,728		
2017	\$452.46	\$441.95	\$1,261,800	\$437.74	\$1,766,880	\$433.53	\$2,271,960	\$429.32	\$2,777,040		
			\$7,188,420		\$10,064,256		\$12,940,092		\$15,815,928		
		Availabl	e Distribution \$		2,875,836		\$5,751,672		\$8,627,508		\$1,309,104
		Practice	size of 250/100	00	\$ 71,896		\$143,792		\$215,688		\$32,728

Net Savings = \$1,309,104 Savings opportunity for Avg. FP = \$235,638



#### The Fall Of The House Of AHERF: The Allegheny Bankruptcy

A chronicle of the hows and whys of the nation's largest nonprofit health care failure.

by Lawton R. Burns, John Cacciamani, James Clement, and Welman Aquino

**PROLOGUE:** The drama of the collapse of the Allegheny Health, Education, and Research Foundation (AHERF) has captured the attention of industry observers from Wall Street to the ivory towers of academe. All are eager to know who ultimately held responsibility—legal, financial, and managerial—for AHERF's decline. Part of the intrigue of the story certainly stems from the fact that so many actors, both inside and outside the company, appear to have played a part. Indeed, the diffusion of responsibility itself may have contributed to the snowballing catastrophe, for as Polish poet Stanslaw Jerzy Lec observed, "No snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible." There are many stories still to be told about why no one was able to stop the "avalanche," and many of them will be told only as they are revealed in the courts. Meanwhile, the health policy community waits to see whether AHERF's fall has implications for other struggling academic health centers.

Robert Burns is James Joo-Jin Kim Professor of Health Care Systems and Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. He has studied integrated delivery systems for more than fifteen years. John Cacciamani is a geriatrics fellow at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine in Philadelphia. James Clement is a consultant at Andersen Consulting Strategic Services in Boston. He and Cacciamani are currently completing master's degrees in business administration at Wharton. Welman Aquino is a nurse manager at New York Presbyterian Hospital and Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in New York City. BUSINESS OF HEALTH 7

HEALTH AFFAIRS - January/February 2000

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# Support for – Population Based Payment

- Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Office of Healthcare reform
- Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative



## **POPULATION BASED PAYMENT®**

Presented to: The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Other Critical Reforms Sub-Committee of the Health Care Reform Implementation Advisory Committee

### November 17, 2010



The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Health Care Reform Implementation Advisory Committee Final Report January 2011

**Major Recommendations included:** 

• Exploring the development of a pilot using Department of Health and Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council data and Population Based Payment® in designated counties.



## **Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative**

"What an excellent presentation of an inspired concept. This will certainly attract an audience, as I'm sure you've found. It is also useful to see ideas customized for the purchaser. And I really like the idea of practice twinning to help the efficient practices help the ones with more challenges."



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## Population Based Payment – A Healthcare Trifecta





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