

Managed Markets Foundational Concepts and Emerging Legal Issues

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*The views expressed in this presentation are those of its author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Gilead Sciences, Inc.

What Is Managed Markets?

- “Managed Markets” customers include a variety of entities involved with the distribution, coverage, or payment of pharmaceutical products.
- Managed Markets Segments include:

Commercial

- PBMs
- Health Plans
- IDNs
- GPOs

Government

- Medicare Part D
- Medicaid (FFS)
- Managed Medicaid
- VA
- Corrections

Trade

- Wholesalers
- Specialty Distributors
- Pharmacies

Pharmaceutical Discount Arrangements

- Manufacturers typically offer discounts to Managed Care Customers in exchange for favorable coverage or formulary placement
 - Off-Invoice Discounts & Rebates
- Discount arrangements should be structured to comply with applicable safe harbors to the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS)
 - Discount Exception & Safe Harbor
 - GPO Safe Harbor
 - Managed Care Exception & Safe Harbors
 - Personal Services and Management Contracts Safe Harbor

Areas For Compliance Policies: Interactions With Managed Care Customers

- Compliance safeguards for interactions with Managed Care Customers, include:
 - **Promotion:** Policies governing “promotional” interactions
 - Evolving FDA guidance regarding HEOR & PIE
 - **P&T Committee Members:** Policies governing interactions with Pharmacy and Therapeutics (P&T) Committees Members
 - **Swapping:** Separate negotiations for commercial/government segments
 - **Patient Privacy:** Policies governing the receipt, use, and disclosure of PHI; Business Associate Agreements; and Data Security
 - **Copay Coupons:** Policies governing discussion of copay coupon programs

Emerging Legal Issues Managed Markets

Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS)

- The AKS prohibits:
 - anyone from offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving anything of value in return for referring an individual for an item or service reimbursed under a federal or state healthcare program
 - Criminal and civil penalties
- **Anyone** = Manufacturers, HCPs, pharmacies, patients
 - **Anything of value** = Payments, meals, gifts, entertainment, back-office services, increased business
 - **In return for** = Some intentional connection
 - **Referring an individual** = Prescribing, recommending
 - **An item or service** = Pharmaceuticals, devices, procedures
 - **Federal healthcare program** = Medicare Part D, Medicaid, and others
 - **Penalties** = Prison + fines + other serious penalties

United States ex rel. Herman v. Coloplast Corp., et al

Evolving Interpretation of the Discount Safe Harbor

- DOJ has sought to interpret the discount safe harbor narrowly

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS	
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, <i>ex rel.</i> KIMBERLY HERMAN, AMY LESTAGE and KEVIN ROSEFF,))))))
Plaintiffs,)
v.	
COLOPLAST CORP.	
Defendants.	
UNITED STATES MOTION FOR	

II. ARGUMENT
A. A Price Reduction Conditioned On the Performance of Promotional or Conversion Campaign Activities Is Not a “Discount” Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)
A discount is a reduction in price conditioned only on the purchase of a product or service at issue. If a reduction in price is conditioned on more than a simple purchase, it is not a mere “discount,” but rather a form of remuneration whose legitimacy must be evaluated under the anti-kickback statute separate and apart from the statutory discount exception or regulatory discount safe harbor. In other words, if a price reduction is conditioned on more than the purchase of a product, then it is not a mere discount and it is irrelevant whether that price reduction was “properly disclosed.”

“If a reduction in price is conditioned on more than a simple purchase, it is not a mere ‘discount,’ but rather a form of remuneration . . .” (Emphasis added)

Brief of the United States, August 8, 2016.

Pharmaceutical Pricing

Insulin Manufacturer Cases: Complaints filed against manufacturers and PBMs in response to pharmaceutical price increases

- Three ongoing cases against Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk and Sanofi
- Two of these cases also pursue major PBMs: CVS/Caremark, ESI, and Optum

Plaintiff Theories:

- **State Consumer Protection / Deceptive Practices:** Allegations that manufacturers inflate WAC prices in order to offer large rebates to PBMs resulting in profits at the expense of consumers
- **Anti-Trust:** Allegations that price increases are the result of an agreement not to compete
- **RICO:** Allegations that manufacturers and PBMs formed a RICO “enterprise” to inflate benchmark prices while deceiving the public that the increased prices fairly and accurately reflected actual drug costs

Exhibit from an Insulin Complaint

Figure 1:

List Price vs Net Price

Patients' out-of-pocket experience for buying medicines will depend on their health plan's benefit design and any financial obligations required in those plans



Copay Coupon Best Price/AMP Theory

- The U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts is investigating manufacturer commercial copay coupons
- Novel theory articulated at conferences in 2017:
 - Manufacturer payments for copay support to patients should be included in government pricing calculations
 - PBM/Plan efforts to negate copay cards result in discounts to plans (and not patients)
 - The copay assistance amount should be stacked on top of discounts to plans for the same product for purposes of government price reporting
- Inconsistent with traditional interpretation of CMS Guidance
 - Code of Federal Regulations expressly exclude coupons from the definition of “Best Price” and “Average Manufacturer Price”

QUESTIONS?