

From Episodes to Bundles: Two Sides of the Same Risk Coin




Fair, Evidence-based Solutions. Real and Lasting Change.

**Second Bundled Payment
Summit**

June 12th 2012

Provider financial risk increases as we move away from FFS



The Episode/Bundle Risk Coin

Retrospectively:

- Actual < Expected =



- Actual > Expected =



Prospectively:

- Actual < Budgeted =



- Actual > Budgeted =



What's the difference?

- You can assess the episode cost performance of a provider without bundling payments
 - Compare the expected costs for an episode with actual costs incurred
- You can't implement bundled payments without defining the episode for which you're bundling services:
 - DRGs bundle all facility services for a specific hospitalization episode
 - The ACE demo pays a single bundle that covers all facility and professional services for a specific hospitalization episode
 - The PROMETHEUS chronic care payment program in CO bundles all services – facility, professional, pharmacy, ancillary – for a chronic condition (and co-morbidities) for an entire year

What are we really talking about?

- **A different unit of accounting:**
 - Not individual professional services or single instances of a stay
 - Not all services for any reason
- **A group of services naturally bound by a medical condition or event/intervention:**
 - Maintains a natural ability for the physicians to arbitrage the supply chain and treatment options
 - Creates a natural compression of waste


What do we want to achieve?

- **Physicians as prudent stewards of the care of the patient**
 - **Doing well financially by doing right for the patient**
- **Significant reduction in unnecessary care**
- **Significant reduction in potentially avoidable complications**
- **Manageable financial risk for payers, providers and patients**

Let's consider an example

- 60 year old with mild COPD and a long history of CAD
- The patient undergoes a PCI
- The patient has an AMI 45 days after the PCI and requires cardiac rehab

What inferences are we trying to make?



Consider the following

- Expected costs are based on observed historical practice patterns that include current overuse of services and excessive complications. Therefore:
 - Actual costs of PCIs with very few complications < Budgeted costs (😊)
 - Actual costs of CAD with fewer PCIs than average < Budgeted costs (😊)
 - Well managed chronic care “clusters” using fewer tests/visits and complications < Budgeted costs (😊)

The National Landscape

Episodes:

- Most commonly-used metric to retrospectively define provider efficiency by commercial health plans
- Foundation of CMS Grouper (see ACA Section 3003 Improvements to the Physicians Feedback Program)

Bundled Payment:

- Over 19 commercial plan implementations spread out in the US
- CMS Acute Care Episode demonstration in Southwest
- CMMI Bundled Payments for Care Improvement

Recent Issue Brief on BP Implementations¹

- Independently conducted by Bailit Purchasing LLC
- 19 sites reviewed throughout the US
 - 9 have fully operationalized at least one bundled payment
 - 2 are conducting “shadow pricing”
 - 8 are in process of operationalizing
- Early results consistent with program design (and findings from CABG by-pass demo and ACE demo) – lower costs, better quality

1. Michael Bailit and Megan Burns, Bundled Payments in The US Today: Status of Implementations and Operational Findings. www.hci3.org

General observations from the field

- Line of sight on accountability
- Manageable variation (e.g. limited heterogeneity of procedures or underlying population)
- Focus on the right zone of "arbitrage":
 - More efficient suppliers
 - More effective treatments

How do these match up with the CMMI BPCI Pilot?

- Line of sight on accountability
- Manageable variation (e.g. limited heterogeneity of procedures or underlying population)
- Focus on the right zone of "arbitrage"
- ✓ Choice of models hones focus
- ✗ All cases in a selected MS-DRG, all MS-DRGs in same class (e.g. PCIs), small samples, deceased patients
- ~ Too many gaming opportunities

Variability based on underlying patient Dx codes

Difference in overall average 30-day episode costs per MS DRG with the average broken down by patient diagnoses:


	243	244	308	309	310
	1	2	3	4	5
1. CAD	\$(1,688)	\$(855)	\$(1,943)	\$(1,697)	\$(826)
2. CHF	\$786	\$1,472	\$(1,251)	\$(265)	\$459
3. DIAB	\$470	\$(252)	\$254	\$33	\$(259)
4. CAD-CHF	\$(303)	\$805	\$(1,103)	\$(426)	\$1,216
5. CAD-DIAB	\$(54)	\$(7)	\$(1,411)	\$135	\$(64)
6. METCAN/DIAL/TRANS	\$(590)	\$3,374	\$2,294	\$318	\$2,473
7. ALL OTHER COMBINATIONS	\$2,098	\$1,507	\$281	\$878	\$1,274
8. UNASGN	\$(721)	\$(571)	\$(792)	\$(792)	\$(1,107)

The obligation to take on all patients with a specific MS-DRG creates a lot of heterogeneity in costs and that mix alone can cause the provider to win/lose

2011 Analysis of a sample of Medicare claims (Parts A and B only)

Underlying Dx drives costs for a given procedure


Difference in Average Costs to 30-days Post Discharge by Condition for Each DRG Compared to Average Across Conditions



2011 Analysis of a sample of Medicare claims (Parts A and B only)




It's even more pronounced when the episode goes out 90 days

Difference in Average Costs to 90-days Post Discharge by Condition for Each DRG Compared to Average Across Conditions



2011 Analysis of a sample of Medicare claims (Parts A and B only)


The mix of procedures in a MS-DRG impacts the episode costs



2011 Analysis of a sample of Medicare claims (Parts A and B only)

Some other problem areas

- All MS-DRGs in a class:
 - Some have low case counts



- Which drives variation in average costs

	Pneumonia					
	177	178	179	193	194	195
Volume (2009)	38	37	13	79	136	77
Average Cost	\$ 21,379	\$ 17,352	\$ 12,073	\$ 14,850	\$ 10,340	\$ 7,751
25th Percentile	\$ 12,080	\$ 9,117	\$ 6,566	\$ 8,712	\$ 6,181	\$ 4,444
Median	\$ 15,241	\$ 12,936	\$ 6,840	\$ 12,335	\$ 7,216	\$ 4,760
75th Percentile	\$ 22,456	\$ 21,597	\$ 17,202	\$ 19,063	\$ 11,929	\$ 7,905
Min	\$ 10,457	\$ 6,248	\$ 5,837	\$ 6,937	\$ 5,273	\$ 3,877
Max	\$ 147,371	\$ 61,929	\$ 32,084	\$ 37,321	\$ 32,698	\$ 29,653
STD DEV	\$ 22,121	\$ 11,905	\$ 8,843	\$ 7,184	\$ 6,884	\$ 5,886
Ave. LOS	9.0	7.6	5.6	7.2	5.4	3.8
Readmits %	16%	11%	23%	17%	9%	8%
PAC %	22%	13%	15%	13%	9%	10%

The CMMI BPCI “death dividend”

- Patients who die during the episode time window are included in estimating the historical average price
 - The greater the number of patients who die during the pilot phase for selected MS-DRGs, the lower the actual average episode costs for those MS-DRGs (everything else being equal), and therefore....

Average Costs with and without Patients who Expire (2009)

	Average Costs			Diference
	Acute Care Costs	Post-Acute Care Costs	Total Costs	
DRG291				
With Expired Patients	\$ 9,284	\$ 13,033	\$ 22,317	
Without Expired Patients	\$ 8,997	\$ 16,340	\$ 25,337	\$ 3,020
17 of 83 patients expired (20%)				14%
DRG 177				
With Expired Patients	\$ 12,514	\$ 8,865	\$ 21,379	
Without Expired Patients	\$ 12,817	\$ 12,031	\$ 24,848	\$ 3,469
10 of 37 patients expired (27%)				16%

Bundled Payments done right yield good results¹

- The HCFA CABG bypass demo was shown to be the highest yielding payment reform demonstration in Medicare history
- The CMS ACE demo is also yielding good results for its participants, particularly in hip and knee replacement procedures
- The PROMETHEUS implementations in NJ and NC are leading to the desired provider behaviors
- Design and execution matter

1. Cutler D and Kaushik G. "The Potential for Cost Savings through Bundled Episode Payments." *New England Journal of Medicine* 366;12 March 22, 2012.

Summary

- **Episode definitions and the underlying construction and severity adjustment logic are the mechanisms that enable the proper inferences on performance and risk assumption by payers and providers**
 - **HCI³ is announcing a strategic relationship with the SAS Institute to build, distribute and support its ECR Analytics, incorporating all knowledge and expertise from years of development and implementations**
- **Bundled payment efforts can be designed to minimize gaming – we've done it – and that usually means avoiding shortcuts**
- **We're finally creating a real market for health care services and competition at a level that matters to consumer-patients**

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